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Abstract 
Given that savings and productivity follow a hump shaped profile with respect to age 
and given that demographic profiles vary across countries, population age structure may 
be linked to differences in levels of economic development. In this paper we measure 
the importance of age structure in accounting for differences in per capita income levels 
and the dispersion of those income levels across countries. We find that even after 
adjusting for country-specific effects, age structure variation can account for a large portion 
of differences in per capita income and the lack of sigma convergence observed in 
cross-country data. For the global economy as a whole, we find that demographic 
maturation has had a strong and positive effect on the evolution of global per-capita income 
since 1960. 
 
Keywords: age structure, life cycle savings model, cross-country growth. 
JEL Classification:  J13, J22, J24, O11, O40. 
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1 Introduction 
“In 1980…living standards, as measured by purchasing power per head, were 
roughly the same [in India and China]. Then, as China embraced modernity…it left 
India behind. In the next 21 years, India outperformed its neighbour in almost nothing 
but population growth.” 
                                                                                         The Economist (2003, p.21) 
 
As workers mature and gain labor market experience, they earn higher wages and save 
greater shares of their income. Combine this observation with the fact that age profiles 
vary considerably across countries (i. e., some countries are young while others are 
significantly older) and it would appear that demographic age structure may play a significant 
role in the process of economic development. This paper explores the connection between 
demographic age structure and the evolution of global per capita income. Specifically, the 
paper asks how much, if any, of the increase in per capita GDP across countries since 1960 
is attributable to the growth in experiential human capital (i. e., demographic maturation which 
increases the number of mature persons as a share of the total population); and similarly, 
what proportion of the observed variation in global per capita GDP between 1960 and 2000 
can be accounted for by differences in age structure across countries? 
To answer these questions the paper applies empirical techniques that have proved 
useful elsewhere in the study of labor market phenomenon; such as the effect of 
declining unionization on US wages [Freeman (1980); Card (2001)]. In our case, these same 
techniques are used to estimate the impact of increasing shares of mature working 
age persons (demographic maturation) on global per capita income. The remainder of the 
paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines the causal mechanisms linking demographic 
maturity to economic performance. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 describes the 
basic set up and presents our estimates for the impact of demographic maturity on 
the evolution of global per capita income. Section 5 presents the results of our estimates 
of the impact of demographic age variation across countries on global income dispersion. 
Section 6 concludes. 
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2 Analytical Background 
Research into the causal effects of demographic change has historically focused on the 
negative impact of high fertility and population growth on the level of output per worker.1 
Indeed most growth models dating back to Barro (1991) and Mankiw et al. (1992), among 
many others, cite the negative coefficient on the rate of population growth as one of the 
strongest observable correlations in cross-country data [(Galor and Weil (1996)]. Today, 
however, there is a growing recognition that birth rates and fertility are as much by-products, 
as sources,2 of economic growth [Jones (2003)].3 
In recognition of these facts, several recent studies have focused on the mechanisms 
by which demographic age structure may affect economic development.4 Bloom and 
Williamson (1998) set out what is perhaps the most direct approach. In their framework, 
population growth is not the mechanism that impedes (or advances) economic performance; 
rather the so-called ‘demographic transition’ induced by falls in infant mortality is the driving 
force. A demographic transition helps to trigger a prolonged fall in fertility and an economic 
expansion that passes through three phases: Initially, expansion is impeded by falling infant 
mortality, as growing youth dependency cohorts swell into the economy; it is then greatly 
abetted in the next phase (fifteen to twenty years later) when the swollen cohort reaches 
working age; and it is modestly impeded again as these workers begin to retire. These age 
distribution effects are therefore transitional, although as the authors note, a full transition 
can take more than 50 years. The authors estimate that age distribution effects can account 
for nearly one-third of East-Asia’s annual growth in GDP per capita from 1965 to 1990. 
Bloom et al. (2001) extend their analysis beyond East Asian economies and find that 
increases in the size of working age population can produce a similar demographic dividend. 
Feyer (2002) considers a model in which a high economy-wide share of mature workers 
relative to the total workforce, leads to higher output per worker. The causal mechanism 
is essentially Mincerian; as workers age they gain experience and this peaks sometime during 
the middle period of a worker’s career. Increases in labour force productivity, brought about 
by workforce maturation, cause output per worker to increase. In his panel estimates he finds 
that roughly one-fifth (17%) of the variation in output per worker across countries is 
attributable to differences in the proportion of 40 to 50 year olds in an economy. He finds 
negative effects for all other age groups relative to this “prime-age” cohort.5 Persson’s (2002) 
empirical study of growth across US states finds that the age structure of the population 
affects total factor productivity in a similar fashion to that of the workforce, in that mature 
                                                                          
1. In the model of Kremer (1993) the growth rate of output is indirectly related to fertility via the size of the population and 
its effect on technological change which in turn affects the growth rate of output. 
2. Family economists, for example, have traditionally emphasized the strong links that both variables have with respect 
to changes in economic performance, which in turn, lead families to reduce fertility as countries become wealthier 
[Becker et al. (1990)]. 
3. Jones (2003) has recently estimated that world population growth, although partly endogenous, is also a 
contributor to the global production of ideas and hence economic growth. He estimates that roughly 10 to 20 percent 
of US economic growth from 1950 to 1993 is due to population growth. 
4. Sarel (1995) appears to be the first published paper to estimate and find a significant effect of the age structure of 
the population on output in a cross-section of countries. However, Sarel’ estimates were performed with only a 
cross-section of countries and lagged output as the only added explanatory variable, making his demographic point 
estimates subject to considerable omitted variables bias.  
5. A subset of Feyer’s analysis also deals with the factor accumulation effects of demographic age structure. 
He finds that prime age cohorts in their 40s and 50s are positively related with higher levels of capital stock. All cohorts 
younger that 40 and older than 60 are negatively related to capital stock levels. 
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age cohorts are positively associated with faster productivity growth.6 Gómez and 
Hernández de Cos (2003) find that the size of the working age population has a strongly 
positive effect on economic performance but that prime-age cohorts have a curvilinear 
association with respect to per capita output growth. That is, there is an optimal ratio of prime 
age workers (35-54 year olds) beyond which, diminishing returns set in.7 
In this paper we adhere to an analytical framework similar to Feyer (2002) and 
Gómez et al. (2003) in that we link demographic maturity and economic performance via 
life-cycle models of worker productivity and consumer behavior. Specifically, our argument 
has two parts. The first part begins when a country undergoes a fall in fertility. Irrespective of 
the cause, the country experiences an initial decline in the ratio of dependents to working 
age persons, which in turn, has an effect on economic output through increases in the relative 
size of the potentially active workforce (those aged 15 to 64) over total population. We term 
this the working age (relative) size effect. Savings rates and labor force productivity will also be 
affected by a growing ratio of working age persons; though the direction of these latter two 
channels is more ambiguous, given that savings behaviour and productivity (embodied in 
either education or experience) varies systematically by age of worker. 
These observations highlight a second but no less important link between 
demographic transitions and economic performance. Falling birth rates affect, with a certain 
lag, not only the size, but also the structure of the working age population. A country with a 
greater number of prime-age persons (aged 35-54) will differ substantially from one that 
has greater numbers of young workers (aged 15-34), even if both have workforces 
that are of the same relative size. In particular, if we consider that three bedrocks of economic 
growth –labor force participation, personal capital accumulation and individual productivity– all 
have a life-cycle component8 and peak when the balance between formal education and 
experience reaches an optimum (i. e., sometime during the prime working ages of 35 and 54), 
it follows that the productive capacity of a society with a large fraction of 35 to 54 year olds 
should be greater than of one with many young entrants in the labor force.9 
The twin experiences of countries like China and India, highlighted in our opening 
quotation, illustrate the relevance of this second factor and the explanatory framework 
more generally. Consider that in 1980 China’s working age structure was younger than 
India’s –as measured by the fraction of person’s aged 15 to 34 over the potentially active 
population aged 15 to 64. It was during this period that China, in addition to embracing 
“modernity”, also began implementing its now infamous “one child policy”. Twenty years on, 
the effects have been striking; the fraction of prime age workers (those aged 35 to 54) 
over the total working age population has risen by 20 percent in China whereas in India 
that fraction has barely registered a change. Such a large and rapid process of 
workforce maturation abetted by a conscious political decision to limit family size, should 
have noticeable effects on major economic aggregates (i. e., savings rates, labour force 
                                                                          
6. Lindh and Malmberg (1999) working with OECD data find similar results, although they include the added savings 
channel to their list of causal factors induced by age structure maturation. 
7. In that paper, a growing cohort of working age persons (15-64) was found to have a large positive effect on growth 
of GDP per capita. In addition, an increase in the number of prime age workers (35-54) as a fraction of the total working 
age population (15-64) was found to have a positive but diminishing effect on per capita GDP growth. We also found 
that growth peaks when the ratio of prime age workers over the potentially active population reaches 0.36. Beyond this 
ratio, diminishing returns set in. 
8. See Gómez and Hernández de Cos (2003) for a discussion of the different channels between saving decisions, 
human capital accumulation and technical efficiency, and age. 
9. This is partly attributable to experiential returns, whereby senior employees (other things equal) are more productive 
than younger counterparts. See Mincer (1974) for a classic reference in this regard. 
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participation, productivity, asset prices, capital per worker etc.,) and in turn over economic 
performance. 
There is an addendum to this two-part story. As noted by Bloom and 
Williamson (1998), the positive effects of a demographic transition with respect to 
economic growth are ultimately just that: transitional. Persistently low birth rates 
eventually produce a decline in the size of the working age population and an increase in 
old-age dependency ratios. This process of population “aging” has raised fears of dampened 
economic performance and the sustainability of public pension systems in many 
high-income economies (i. e., Japan and Germany). Ultimately, however, whether the 
beneficial effects of demographic maturation are transitional or not is secondary, 
since the transitional element only relates to rates of economic growth. In this paper we 
are interested in the cumulative effects of demographic maturation, so for our purposes, 
any boost to per capita growth, transitional or otherwise, will have a permanent effect on 
the level of per capita income. This, we believe, may help account for differences in those 
income levels far into the future, especially across countries that at present appear very 
similar. 
Examining whether demographic shifts have had an appreciable effect over per 
capita income levels across a broad sample of countries is the question that we now turn to. 
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3 The Data 
We employ a composite dataset made up of version 6.1 of the Penn World Tables (PWT) and 
data provided by the United Nations Population Division. The latest version of PWT, which 
Summers and Heston (2002) have been collecting for more than a decade, includes PPP 
adjusted measures of income per-capita for approximately 144 countries from 1950 
to 2000.10 The United Nations World Population Prospects (2001), provides corresponding 
demographic data for 160 countries from 1950 to 2000.11 Merging both datasets produces 
an unbalanced panel of 142 countries and 842 observations.12 
Figure 1 provides a descriptive overview of the changes in population age 
structure that have occurred across our sample of countries over the past four decades. 
The figure documents changes in two key demographic measures of maturity. Our first 
measure is the ratio of the potentially active working age population (15-64) over the total 
population, which we capture with the variable MATURE: 
64
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The variable is a ratio, showing the number of potentially active persons (15-64) W 
over the total population P. The expectation is that countries with higher shares of 15 to 64 
year olds, all things constant, will experience faster growth and ultimately contribute to higher 
levels of GDP per capita. 
Our second measure captures the structure of this working age population, and it is 
the share of prime aged workers (35-54) within the 15 to 64 age group. This second effect 
is identified with the variable PRIMEAGE, which captures the fact that both productivity and 
labour force participation vary by age of worker. We use the number of person’s aged 35 
to 54, w over the total number of potentially active persons W to measure: 
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We sometimes refer to (1) and (2) above as the size and structure of the working age 
population respectively. 
                                                                          
10. Naturally, if our goal was to estimate global welfare, a population-weighted GDP per capita measure is 
preferable. See Theil (1979 and 1996) and references contained therein for early work on this question. For more recent 
work see Schultz (1998); Firebaugh (1999); Melchior, Telle and Wig (2000); Dowrick and Akmal (2001); and Bourguignon 
and Morrisson (2002). 
11. One potential problem with our composite dataset, is that it treats countries as diverse in population size as India 
and Sao Tome as independent data points with equal weights. However, this is not as bad an approximation as it 
sounds, since as noted by Sala-i-Martin (2002), when the analysis centres on the effect of certain country characteristics 
on per capita GDP, as in our case, it is sensible to treat each country as a single data point. 
12. Including countries for which age structure or per capita GDP figures were not missing in at least one observed time 
period. 
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Panel A of figure 1 shows an increase in the size of the working age population 
MATURE from 1960 to 2000. For the global economy, the percentage of persons aged 15 
to 64 increased from 56.4 in 1960 to 60.9 in 2000. In Panel B, we see the clear U shaped 
pattern of our second age structure measure PRIMEAGE –the ratio of prime-age workers 
over the total working age population. The shape is the delayed consequence of the post-war 
baby boom, which from 1960 to 1980 swelled the 15 to 64 population with young workers. 
Figure 1 also shows that age structure patterns differ across country groupings; e. g., OECD 
and Non-OECD countries display a marked diversity of age profiles. Countries in the 
OECD, for example, have had larger shares of potentially active working age person from 
the 1960s onward, and despite having grown younger in the 1980s, the OECD’s age 
structure never approached levels found in the Non-OECD world. In Panel B, we see that 
in 2000, 42.7 percent of the OECD´s working age population was aged 35 to 54 versus 
only 33.7 percent for non-OECD countries. 
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Figure 1: Size and Structure of the Working Age Population, 1960-2000 
 
Panel A. Size: Ratio of Potentially Active Population (15-64) over Total Population 
 
Panel B. Structure: Ratio of Prime Aged (34-54) to Total Working Age Population (15-64) 
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Tables 1a and 1b compare the characteristics of demographically mature countries 
against younger country counterparts in three periods 1960s, 1980s, and 2000. The tables 
are constructed first by creating dichotomous versions of the two working age population 
ratios defined above.13 In Table 1a, we categorise those countries with a ratio of prime-age 
workers greater than 0.365 over the working age population as being mature, and those with 
a ratio less than or equal to 0.365, as being young. In Table 1b a ratio of the working age 
population of 0.65 over the total population is used as the cut-off point between young and 
mature countries.14 The results in both tables are broadly congruent. Mature countries, 
however defined, typically have higher savings rates (row 2), lower income inequality (row 3), 
and greater levels of political participation (row 5). Rows 6 through 11 show mean income 
levels for mature and young country groupings, as well as a set of “raw” income gaps 
between the two groupings. 
In both tables, mean income levels are higher in mature countries, with a widening 
in this gap observed from 1980 onward. In Table 1a, for example, we see that in 1960 the 
raw gap in real per capita GDP (row 7) between prime and non prime-age countries 
was 4475 ($US); and that by 2000 that gap had reached 11933 ($US). 
                                                                          
13. This is suitable not only for descriptive purposes but also on the grounds that this will allow us to better estimate 
the effect of population maturation across different country-club demographic groupings. This parallels recent work by 
Durlauf and Quah (1999), among others, who find evidence of convergence club groupings and twin-peak distributions 
across development indicators. A list of mature countries which fall into these dichotomous categories are available from 
the authors upon request. 
14. Different cut-off ratios points were tested for both definitions of maturity. The ratios finally selected were those 
generating the largest real GDP gaps between the two groups. In the case of the prime-age variable, the selected cut-off 
ratio is also equal to the ratio at which growth peaks, as found by Gómez and Hernández de Cos (2003). See footnote 7 
for more details. 
Table 1a: Characteristics of Countries by Structure of Working Age Population (Mature, Young) in 1960, 1980, 2000 
 
 1960 1980 2000 
 Ratio 35-54/15-64 Ratio 35-54/15-64 Ratio 35-54/15-64 
 Mature > 0.36 Young = < 0.35 Mature > 0.36 Young = < 0.35 Mature > 0.36 Young = < 0.35 
1. Working Age Population Ratio (15-64/0-65+) 0.612 0.537 0.647 0.553 0.669 0.557 
       
2.National Savings Rate (percent) 22.0 8.5 22.0 7.2 17.6 3.3 
       
3.Inequality (Gini ratio X 100) 39.2 46.5 29.1 41.6 29.7 42.2 
       
4.Openess (Exports + Imports/GDP) 55.4 69.8 73.8 74.5 106.3 74.6 
       
5.Voter Turnout (percent) 75.7 52.0 79.3 63.4 67.9 58.4 
       
6.Real GDP per capita (mean) 6323 1848 12685 4579 14864 2931 
       
7.Real GDP Gap  -- 4475 -- 8106 -- 11933 
       
8.Per Capita GDP relative to US (US=100) 51.8 15.2 60.3 22.5 45.0 9.0 
       
9.Relative GDP Gap -- 36.6 -- 37.8 -- 36.0 
       
10.Log Real GDP per capita(mean) 8.504 7.336 9.285 7.999 9.377 7.681 
       
11.Log Real GDP Gap -- 1.168 -- 1.286 -- 1.696 
       
12. Std. Dev. Log Real GDP 0.825 0.620 0.728 0.934 0.737 0.817 
 (0.884) (0.884) (1.025) (1.025) (1.152) (1.152) 
13. Interquartile Range (p75 – p25) 1.096 0.906 0.584 1.444 1.183 1.453 
 (1.299) (1.299) (1.684) (1.684) (1.809) (1.809) 
14.Number of Observations 37 75 22 102 67 75 
15.Proportion of Total (percent) 32.1 77.9 17.8 82.2 47.1 52.9 
 
Notes: Demographic data based on United Nations World Population Prospects. A full account of all variables can be found in Appendix Table 1. The GINI measures 
for 2000 are for 1990. Numbers in brackets in rows 13 and 14 are the all-country (global) variance measure. 
B
A
N
C
O
 D
E
 E
S
P
A
Ñ
A 17
 
D
O
C
U
M
E
N
T
O
 O
C
A
S
IO
N
A
L N
.º 0604 
 Table 1b: Characteristics of Countries by Size of Working Age Population (Mature, Young) in 1960, 1980, 2000 
 1960 1980 2000 
 Ratio 15-64/Total Population Ratio 15-64/Total population Ratio 15-64/Total population 
 Mature > 0.65 Young = < 0.65 Mature > 0.65 Young = < 0.65 Mature > 0.65 Young = < 0.65 
1.Prime Working Age Population (35-54/15-64) 0.380 0.328 0.365 0.299 0.403 0.298 
       
2.National Savings Rate (percent) 26.9 10.1 26.0 4.2 17.0 2.5 
       
3.Inequality (Gini ratio X 100) 37.7 45.1 30.0 43.6 31.6 42.5 
       
4.Openess (Exports + Imports/GDP) 48.5 55.3 85.7 71.8 103.5 74.3 
       
5.Voter Turnout (percent) 77.8 56.7 77.3 61.5 67.5 57.9 
       
6.Real GDP per capita (mean) 7219 2531 13772 3320 13961 2685 
       
7.Real GDP Gap  -- 4688 -- 10452 -- 11276 
       
8.Per Capita GDP relative to US (US=100) 59.3 20.6 64.2 17.1 42.3 8.2 
       
9.Relative GDP Gap  38.6  47.0  34.0 
       
10.Log Real GDP per capita (mean) 8.746 7.512 9.437 7.807 9.302 7.589 
       
11.Log Real GDP Gap  1.233  1.630  1.712 
       
12. Std. Dev. Log Real GDP 0.607 0.781 0.500 0.800 0.740 0.802 
 (0.884) (0.884) (1.025) (1.025) (1.152) (1.152) 
13. Interquartile Range (p75 – p25) 0.756 1.025 0.514 1.275 1.326 1.398 
 (1.299) (1.299) (1.684) (1.684) (1.809) (1.809) 
14.Number of Observations 19 93 32 92 74 68 
15.Proportion of Total (percent) 16.9 83.1 25.8 79.2 52.1 47.9 
 
Notes: Demographic data based on United Nations World Population Prospects. A full account of all variables can be found in Appendix Table 1. The GINI measures 
for 2000 are for 1990. Numbers in brackets in rows 13 and 14 are the all-country (global) variance measure.
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Rows 12-13 in Tables 1a and 1b present measures of dispersion in per capita 
income between mature and non-mature country groupings. The first entry is the standard 
deviation of log per capita real GDP and the second represents the inter-quartile range 
of log GDP. These simple measures of income dispersion illustrate several important facts. 
First, per capita incomes are generally less disperse within mature country groupings than 
in younger ones. Second, income dispersion has risen more dramatically for non-mature 
countries from 1960 to 1980, whereas it fell for the mature sector during that same 
time period. Third, there is no evidence of global sigma-convergence as overall dispersion 
(the number in brackets in rows 12 and 13) has increased year-on-year since 1960. This latter 
result is consistent with other studies [Salai-i-Martin (1996)] which show that the standard 
all country (i. e., global) measure of sigma convergence has widened since 1960, but that 
within certain convergence club groupings (i. e., as within the OECD or as in our case, for 
mature-aged countries) dispersion narrowed and sigma-convergence can be said to have 
occurred between 1960 and 1990. 
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4 The Effect of Maturity on Per-Capita Income levels 
4.1 Assumptions 
How much, if any, of the global increase in per capita GDP since 1960 is attributable to 
demographic maturation? Similarly, what proportion of the observed variation in per capita 
GDP across countries can be accounted for by differences in age structure? These questions 
lie at the heart of our paper. To answer them, a few simplifying assumptions are required. 
In particular, we need to assume that countries can be assigned to different working age 
categories (e. g., young or mature); that these working age categories are imperfect 
substitutes in production at the micro-level, e. g., young workers may perform well on the 
shop floor but perform rather poorly in the boardroom;15 that population age structure, 
especially that of the working age population aged 15 to 64, is predetermined with a lag of 
roughly fifteen years and hence exogenous with respect to current economic conditions; that 
external migration is not large enough to mute the impact of historical fertility declines;16 and 
finally, that productivity and savings rates are generally higher amongst prime-age working 
age cohorts (i. e., workers aged 35-54) than younger ones (15-34).17 Taken together, these 
five assumptions imply that countries that are demographically mature (i. e., greater shares of 
mature and prime-age working age populations) should, other things equal, display higher per 
capita income levels than younger counterparts. 
4.2 The Basic Set-up and Baseline Results 
In modelling the effect of demographic maturity on cross-country income differentials and the 
dispersion of those income levels over time, we start by adopting an empirical approach 
first used by Freeman (1980) and later elaborated by Card (2001) to measure the effect 
of unionisation on wage structures in union and non-unionised sectors of the economy. 
This basic set-up is based on the previously mentioned assumptions and, in particular, on the 
assumption that countries can be categorized in homogeneous groups according to 
their working age characteristics (mature and young countries), implying that differences in 
income between mature and young countries are attributable to the effect of age structure 
only, thus ignoring other causes of income differences and unobserved heterogeneity across 
countries. In our case, we appropriate the same techniques to make a first approximation to 
the quantification of the relationship between population age structure and per capita income 
differentials across country groupings. The previous assumptions will be relaxed later in order 
to provide a more robust estimate of the importance of demographic maturity with respect to 
per-capita income differentials over time. 
Let mity  represent the log income per capita that country i at time t would attain with 
a mature age working age population m, and let gity represent the log income per capita for 
the same country if it had a young working age population g. Assume that18 
                                                                          
15. We follow Kremer and Thomson (1998) who make this the cornerstone of their own paper on the impact of 
demographic age structure in forestalling economic convergence across countries. 
16. As noted by Bloom and Williamson (1998): “In the late twentieth century, international migrations are simply not great 
enough to matter…They mattered a great deal, however, in the age of relatively unrestricted mass migration prior to 
World War 1.” 
17. In this regard both Weil (1994) and Feyer (2002) find evidence that savings rates peak for workers in their fifties. 
This is consistent with life-cycle models of saving as first proposed by Modigliani (1986). 
18. We assume as well that countries can be classified into distinct country groupings based on some observable 
demographic data. 
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ty  are the mean log per capita income levels of mature and young countries 
at time t. Homogeneity within country groups is reflected in the assumption that [ ] [ ] .0youngmature =Ε=Ε gimi εε  The log per capita output gap between mature and 
young countries at time t will be denoted by 
,gt
m
t
y
t yy −=∆  (3) 
which based on our theoretical discussion should be positive, 0>∆yt . 
If we let mt denote the fraction of countries at time t which fall into our predefined 
demographically mature category, then the mean log per capita income level for all countries 
in the global economy at time t is simply: 
.
	
m
ty
y
tt
g
tt myy ∆⋅+=  (4) 
Note that the mean log per-capita income gain for the global economy associated 
with demographic maturity is the product of the proportion of countries categorised as being 
mature and the (positive) mature income gap. 
In the presence of mature countries, the estimate of global log per-capita income at 
time t is simply the expectation of (4) 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]yttgtyttgttt mEyEmyEyEy ∆⋅+=∆⋅+==  (4’) 
If every country had a young working age population then global per capita 
outcomes would simply be 
[ ]gtgt yEy =  
Thus, the effect of demographic maturity on global per capita income, relative to that 
which would occur if all countries achieved output levels with young working age populations, 
is: 
[ ]yttgtt mEyy ∆⋅=−  (5) 
We use the simple two-sector framework above to measure the effect of changing 
age structure on changes in per capita income across all countries in our sample. 
A comparison of this differential over time provides an unconditional measure of the changing 
effect of demographic maturity on global income per capita. Table 2 illustrates the application 
of this formula in 1960 and 2000: the underlying data are drawn from Table 1. Recall that 
we divided the global economy into two groups –a mature and a young sector– and two 
definitions of maturity were used to produce this classification. The first captured 
demographic maturity through the relative size of the working age population. A ratio of 0.65 
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for the number of 15 to 64 year olds over the total population functioned as our cut off in 
this regard. Countries below this margin were considered young and countries above 
were defined as mature. Our second measure of maturity focused on the proportion of 15 
to 64 year olds who were of prime working age (35 to 54). A ratio greater than 0.365 served 
as our age structure measure of maturity. 
Table 2: Estimates of the Contribution of Demographic Maturation to the Change in Global Per-capita 
Income, 1960 to 2000 
 
 
Mature Working  
 
Mature Working 
Age Size Age Structure 
 
1960 
[1] 
Raw 
[2] 
Adjusted 
[3] 
Raw 
[4] 
Adjusted 
 
1. Mean of Global Real Income Per-capita in Logs ( y ) 
 
7.722 
 
7.722 
 
7.722 
 
7.722 
 
2. Relative Fraction of Countries with Mature Working Age Population (m ) 
 
0.169 
 
0.169 
 
0.321 
 
0.321 
 
3. Per-capita Income Gap Between Mature and Young Sectors in  
Logs ( y∆ ) 
 
1.233 
 
0.573 
 
1.168 
 
0.385 
 
4. Relative Demographic Maturity Effect ( gyy − ) 
 
0.208 
 
0.097 
 
0.374 
 
0.124 
 
2000 
    
 
1. Mean of Global Real Income Per-capita in Logs ( y ) 
 
8.482 
 
8.482 
 
8.482 
 
8.482 
 
2. Relative Fraction of Countries with Mature Working Age Population (m ) 
 
0.521 
 
0.521 
 
0.471 
 
0.471 
 
3. Per-capita Income Gap Between Mature and Young Sectors  in 
 Logs ( y∆ ) 
 
1.712 
 
1.190 
 
1.696 
 
1.081 
 
4. Relative Demographic Maturity Effect ( gyy − ) 
 
0.892 
 
0.620 
 
0.798 
 
0.509 
 
Changes between 2000 and 1960     
 
1.Change in Mean of Global Real Income Per-capita ( 6000 yy − ) 
 
0.760 
 
0.760 
 
0.760 
 
0.760 
 
2.Change in Demographic Maturity Effect ( gyy 0000 − )-( gyy 6060 − ) 
 
0.684 
 
0.523 
 
0.424 
 
0.386 
 
3.Share of Global Income Change Due to Demographic Maturity Effect (%) 
 
89.9 
 
68.8 
 
55.8 
 
50.7 
 
Decomposing the Maturity Effect between 2000 and 1960 
    
1.Change in Demographic Effect ( gyy 0000 − )-( gyy 6060 − ) 0.684 
(100) 
0.523 
(100) 
0.424 
(100) 
0.386 
(100) 
2.Total due to Change in Income Gap (D1) 0.145 
(21.1) 
0.184 
(35.2) 
0.175 
(41.3) 
0.182 
(47.1) 
3.Total due to Change in Share of Mature Countries (D2) 0.538 
(78.6) 
0.340 
(64.9) 
0.249 
(58.7) 
0.203 
(52.9) 
 
Notes: Size refers to the dummy created from the ratio of mature working age population to 15 to 64 year 
olds over the total population. Structure refers to the dummy created from the ratio of prime age 
workers aged 35 to 54 over the working age population. See text equations (3) to (5) for an explanation 
of formulas and Table 1a and 1b for underlying data. Columns [1] and [3] represent the unconditional 
estimates of the gap in GDP per capita (row 3 in 1960 and 2000 panels) between mature and young 
country groups. Columns [2] and [4] represent the fixed-effect adjusted estimates of the gap in GDP per 
capita between mature and young country group. 
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Examination of columns [1] and [3] of Table 2 shows that ignoring other causes 
of income differences and unobserved heterogeneity across countries, the increase in our first 
and second measures of maturity between 1960 and 2000 would have been expected 
to cause global income to rise by 0.684 and 0.424 respectively. During this period, the 
actual mean of per capita (log) global income rose by 0.760. Thus, a naïve calculation 
suggests that growth in the size and structure of the working age population can each explain 
about 90 and 56 percent of the rise in global income per capita respectively since 1960. 
This basic set-up and the results it generates provide a transparent way of 
characterising the importance of demographic maturity with respect to per-capita income 
differentials over time. Apart from this, the set-up also facilitates the use of standard 
shift-share techniques, which can more formally evaluate the effects of demographic maturity 
on the evolution of global income. 
To illustrate, consider the change in mean per capita income of mature countries 
relative to young countries between 1960 and 2000. Let )( 6060
gyy −  denote the relative 
effect of demographically mature countries on global GDP per capita in 1960 and let 
)( 0000
gyy − denote the same effect in 2000. Using this notation, the change in the income 
gap between mature and young countries from 1960 to 2000 is 

	
	
)(
6060
)(
0000
6000
)()(
Y
g
Y
g yyyyD
∆∆
−−−=  (6) 
The distribution of global income may change for a variety of reasons, one of which 
may be shifting proportions of mature countries or a widening in the income gap between 
mature and young countries. Equation (4) allows us to capture the relative importance of each 
effect. To see this more clearly, let 
0060Y∆ denote the income gap that would have occurred 
if the 1960 difference in per capita GDP between mature and young country groups is 
re-weighted to have the same fraction of mature countries as in 2000. The relative change D 
can be decomposed as: 
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ].and
,
where
)(
6060
)(
60002
)(
6000
)(
00001
21
600060
006000

	
	

	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mEmED
mEmED
DDD
∆∆
∆∆
∆⋅−∆⋅=
∆⋅−∆⋅=
+=
 (7) 
The first of these components represents the change in relative income that would 
have occurred if there had been no change in the fraction of countries with a mature 
workforce. The second component represents the difference between the counterfactual 
income-gap in 1960 (constructed to have the 2000 fraction of mature countries) and the 
actual gap in that year. 
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Our decomposition of these maturity effects can be found in the last panel of 
Table 2. In column 1 row 3 we see that 0.538, or a majority (78.6 percent) of the working 
age size effect (i. e., MATURE), is attributable to the rise in the fraction of countries with 
mature working age populations. Slightly less than a quarter (21.1 percent) of this effect is 
due to the increase in the income gap between mature and non-mature countries (0.145).19 
Although the overall effect was much smaller in magnitude for the PRIMEAGE ratio, in 
column 3 we see that it displays much the same pattern of results, as both panels show that 
the share of mature countries, however defined, had a much stronger impact on the evolution 
of global income in the period from 1960 to 2000. 
4.3 Controlling for Other Causes of Income Differences 
In order to properly isolate the importance of demographic maturity we need to estimate 
(rather than simply measure) structural parameters associated with mature working age 
populations and their effect on real income levels. Such an approach is possible using a 
simple descriptive model of the form: 
ititititit eZSPy ++++= −− δϕλα 64155435  (8) 
where ity is the log level of real income per capita of country i at time t , α  is our constant, 
5435−
itP is a binary indicator of mature working age structure that equals 1 if country i have 
greater than 0.365 percent of their working age population aged 35 to 54 in period t, 6415−itS  
is our dummy measure of maturity which is 1 if the share of persons aged 15-64 over the 
population is greater than 0.65 i at time t, and where itZ  is some vector of time dummy 
variables. 
Although seemingly straightforward, this type of exercise is crucial if we wish to 
partial out the effect of each maturity channel on the income gap.20 In addition, with a minor 
addition, the simple descriptive model above also allows us to calculate income gaps 
between mature and non-mature countries with unobserved heterogeneity taken into 
account. If mature countries have characteristics that simultaneously make them more 
productive and more mature, then even the estimated gaps may exaggerate the demographic 
effect. In order to account for cross-country heterogeneity, we use the conventional 
within-estimation technique (fixed-effect estimator) that essentially transforms equation (6) into 
a differenced equation. Our expectation is that the fixed effect estimation should lower 
the prime age coefficient relative to the raw measures, but not eliminate its significance. 
Table 3 shows the results of these panel adjusted estimates. It compares the raw log gaps in 
                                                                          
19. The increase in the income gap between sectors is interesting. One explanation lies in the divergence in 
the percentage of prime age workers observed in both sectors during this time period. As seen in first row of Table 1a 
and 1b, the non-mature sector became even younger while the mature sector became even more mature. 
20. Note that if the size of the working age population is related to its age structure at the national level –i. e., relatively 
large working age populations tend to have mature age structures– a regression of (6) that omits the share of prime-age 
working age persons and only includes the size of the working age population dummy regressed against income, would 
yield a coefficient with probability limit 
)(
),(
it
tiit
SVar
PSCovλϕ + . 
If the share of prime age workers in an economy is positively related to national income, as our theoretical overview 
suggests, and if this share also tends to be larger for countries with larger working age populations, then our 
unconditional estimates of ϕ  would be biased upwards since λ  0> . 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 0604 
per capita GDP from row 11 in Tables 1a and 1b with a series of “panel-data adjusted” gaps 
based on fixed effect estimates of equation (6). The results for our fixed effect estimations are 
in line with our expectation; i. e., the magnitudes of our estimated gaps are 30 percent lower 
than the raw estimates. 
Table 3: Estimates of the Effect of Unobserved Heterogeneity and Age Structure on the Income Gap 
between Mature and Young Countries. 
 
 
 Size of Log per capita GDP gap 
Panel A: Working Age Size Effect 
Raw Gap 
,gt
m
t
y
t yy −=∆  
[1] 
Adjusted Gap 
y∆ =ϕ  
 [2] 
Year   
1960 1.233 0.573 
1980 1.630 1.097 
2000 1.712 1.190 
 Size of Log per capita GDP gap 
Panel B: Prime Age Structure Effect 
Raw Gap 
,gt
m
t
y
t yy −=∆  
[1] 
Adjusted Gap 
y∆ = λ  
[2] 
Year   
1960 1.168 0.385 
1980 1.286 0.882 
2000 1.696 1.081 
 
Notes: Raw income gaps are actual differences in mean log income per capita between prime 
and non-prime age countries in each period. These gaps are taken from Tables 1a and 1b rows 11. 
Panel data adjusted income gaps are taken from a fixed effect regression with time period 
dummies added. The fixed effect coefficients on our mature and prime-age variables are then added to 
each common time period effect. See text and equation (6) for a fuller explanation of column [2] adjusted 
gaps. 
 
If we use our adjusted results together with data from our original Table 2 to 
re-estimate the contribution of changing demographic maturity to rising global income, we 
find that the results are qualitatively very similar to the naïve calculations with one noticeable 
difference; the magnitudes of the mature size and structure effects are substantially 
reduced. In Table 2 column 2 (last panel), we see that the proportion of the overall rise in 
income that can be explained by our first measure of demographic maturity –the relative 
size of the 15 to 64 year old population over the total– drops from 90 percent under the 
naïve calculations to 68 percent using the conditional fixed-effect estimates. In terms of 
the prime-age structure effect, in Table 2 column 4 (last panel) it falls from 57 percent under 
the unconditional estimates to 50 percent in the conditional fixed-effect estimates. 
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5 Demographic Maturity and Sigma-Convergence 
Can the widening of global income dispersion –the so-called decline in “sigma-convergence”– 
that has occurred since the 1980s be linked to similar polarizations in age structures?21 That 
is, in addition to affecting the mean level of income per capita, can demographic variation 
across countries also affect the dispersion of per capita income within the global economy? 
We turn now to this issue. Let 
[ ] mtmit vVar =ε      and 
[ ] ,gtgit vVar =ε  
represent the variances of log income per capita for countries with mature and young 
populations at time t, respectively. The “variance gap” between mature and non-mature 
countries will be denoted by 
.gt
m
t
v
t vv −=∆  (9) 
The variance of log income per-capita for the global economy at time t can therefore 
be computed in a fashion similar to our estimate of global mean income in (3): 
.)1(
Effect Between
2
Effect Within
 
 	
	
y
ttt
v
tt
g
tt mmmvv ∆⋅−+∆⋅+=  (10) 
This equation shows that the presence of countries with mature population age 
structures can exert a within-age-category effect on global income dispersion –associated 
with any lowering (or raising) of the dispersion of per-capita income outcomes relative to 
countries with a non-mature population– and a between-age-category effect associated 
with any widening of mean per-capita incomes between mature and non-mature countries. 
The implications for sigma convergence arising from these twin (and potentially offsetting) 
effects are discussed in more detail below. 
In the presence of age structure variation, the dispersion in income per capita for the 
global economy in a given time period is  
[ ] [ ]2)1( ytttvttgtgtt mmmvEyVarv ∆⋅−⋅+∆⋅++=  
[ ] ] [ ] [[ ]2)1( ytttvttgtgtt mmEmEvEyVarv ∆⋅−⋅+∆⋅++= , 
where variances and expectations are taken over countries. If every country attained income 
levels based on those in young countries, the variance of global (all country) incomes would 
be: 
                                                                          
21. Although Sala-i-Martin (1996) finds general support for both absolute and conditional convergence in a variety 
of datasets, the only dataset that displays absolute divergence is the global dataset of 100 countries. Others have 
found divergence in the form of “twin peak” distributions, or a clustering of rich and poor countries [Quah (1997)]. 
See Jones (1997) for a useful summary. 
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[ ] [ ]gtgtgt vEyVarv +=  (11) 
Thus, the effect of demographic maturity on the variance of global income per capita, 
relative to the variance that would occur if all countries obtained the income of non-mature 
working age populations, is: 
[ ] [ ] 
 	
	
Effect Between
2
Effect Within
)1( yttt
v
tt
g
tt mmEmEvv ∆⋅−⋅+∆⋅=−  (12) 
As before, this produces a “within” and a “between” mature country effect. Given our 
prior expectation about the role of a mature population in increasing income levels relative 
to younger country counterparts, the second effect has a necessarily positive influence on the 
variance of cross-country income differentials (i. e., an inhibiting influence on the process of 
cross-country income convergence). The first effect, however, could be positive or negative 
depending on whether income levels are relatively less disperse within mature countries. 
To the extent that these two forces work in the opposite direction, the question of whether 
demographic maturation minimizes or increases income differentials across countries is 
chiefly an empirical one. 
A comparison of this size differential over time provides us with a measure of the 
effect of changing age structure on sigma-convergence. Equation (10), through its separation 
of between and within age structure effects, also shows the relative balance of demographic 
forces acting upon global inequality. A greater proportion of countries with mature working 
age populations can foster convergence, since income dispersion within this sector has 
generally been lower than in the young sector. However, since income levels between the two 
sectors are so disparate, growth in the income gap between sectors is equally capable of 
fostering inequality and thus inhibiting convergence. 
Examination of columns 1 and 3 in Table 4 demonstrates that the maturing of 
the global economy, both in terms of the size and structure of the working age 
population, between 1960 and 2000 should have caused the variance of global income to 
rise by 0.526 and 0.231 respectively. As shown in columns 1 and 3 of row 8 of Table 4, 
between 1960 and 2000, the observed dispersion of (log) per-capita income in the global 
economy rose by 0.510. Thus a naïve calculation would suggest that changes in our first 
measure of maturity –the size of the potentially active working age population– are associated 
with 100 percent of the growth in global per capita income variance and that age structure 
change can explain roughly 45 percent of the rise in global income inequality since 1960. 
In both cases, the increase in variance is fully attributable to the between-age-category effect, 
since the within variance effect would have actually lowered global dispersion by 0.188 in the 
case of our structural measure of maturity and contributed to only a negligible rise (0.008) in 
the case of the size of the working age population measure. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 28 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 0604 
Table 4: Estimates of the Contribution of Demographic Maturation to Changes in Global Log per-capita 
Income Dispersion (Inter-quartile Range), 1960 to 2000 
 
Mature Working 
Age Size 
Mature Working 
Age Structure 
 
 
 
1960 
[1] 
Raw 
[2] 
Adjusted 
[3] 
Raw 
[4] 
Adjusted 
 
1.Global Variance of Real Income Per-capita (
tv ) 
 
1.299 
 
1.299 
 
1.299 
 
1.299 
 
2.Relative Fraction of Countries with Mature Working Age  
Populations (m ) 
 
0.169 
 
0.169 
 
0.321 
 
0.321 
 
3.Per-capita Income Gap Between Mature and Young Sectors  
in Logs ( y∆ ) 
 
1.233 
 
0.523 
 
1.168 
 
0.385 
 
4.Log Variance Gap Between Mature and Young Sectors  ( v∆ ) 
 
-0.269 
 
-0.269 
 
0.190 
 
0.190 
 
5. Between-Age-Category Effect   2)1( yttt mm ∆−  
 
0.214 
 
-0.046 
 
0.297 
 
0.032 
 
6.Within-Age-Category Effect ( v
ttm ∆ ) 
 
-0.045 
 
0.046 
 
0.061 
 
0.061 
 
7.Total Demographic Maturation Effect  ( gvv − ) 
 
0.168 
 
0.001 
 
0.358 
 
0.093 
 
2000     
 
1.Global Variance of Real Income Per-capita (
tv ) 
 
1.809 
 
1.809 
 
1.809 
 
1.809 
 
2.Relative Fraction of Countries with Mature Working Age  
Populations  (m ) 
 
0.521 
 
0.521 
 
0.471 
 
0.471 
 
3.Per-capita Income Gap Between Mature and Young Sectors  
in Logs ( y∆ ) 
 
1.712 
 
1.190 
 
1.696 
 
1.081 
 
4.Log Variance Gap Between Mature and Young Sectors ( v∆ ) 
 
-0.072 
 
-0.072 
 
-0.270 
 
-0.270 
 
5. Between-Age-Category Effect  ( 2)1( yttt mm ∆− ) 
 
0.393 
 
0.353 
 
0.717 
 
0.291 
 
6.Within-Age-Category Effect  ( v
ttm ∆ ) 
 
-0.038 
 
-0.038 
 
-0.127 
 
-0.127 
 
7.Total Demographic Maturation Effect ( gvv − )  0.694 
 
0.316 
 
0.589 
 
0.164 
 
Change between 2000 and 1960     
 
8.Change in Global Variance of Real Income Per-capita 
)( 6000 vv −  
 
0.510 
 
0.510 
 
0.510 
 
0.510 
 
9.Change in Between-Age-Category Effect 
 
0.518 
 
0.307 
 
0.419 
 
0.259 
 
10.Change in Within-Age-Category Effect 
 
0.008 
 
0.008 
 
-0.188 
 
-0.188 
 
11.Change in Total Demographic Maturity Effect 
)()( 60600000
gg vvvv −−−  
 
0.526 
 
0.315 
 
0.231 
 
0.071 
 
12.Share Attributable to Demographic Maturation (Percent) 
 
100.0 
 
61.8 
 
45.2 
 
13.8 
 
Notes: Size refers to the dummy created from the ratio of mature working age population to 15 to 64 year 
olds over the total population. Structure refers to the dummy created from the ratio of prime age 
workers aged 35 to 54 over the working age population. See text equations (8) to (9) for an explanation 
of formulas and Table 1a an 1b for underlying data. Columns [1] and [3] represent the unconditional 
estimates of the between effect based on the raw GDP per capita gap. Columns [2] and [4] represent the 
fixed-effect adjusted estimates of the between effect based on the adjusted GDP per capita gap between 
mature and young country groups. 
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Again, there are several reasons to suspect that the unconditional calculations of the 
mature income gap used in columns 1 and 3 of Table 4 may misrepresent the role of 
demographic maturity. The effects ascribed to our first measure of maturity, in particular, 
seem quite large. The first problem is that the naïve calculations for the mature working age 
size income gap fail to condition on the structure of the working age population (and vice 
versa). Second, the results above have failed, even in the most standard way, to control for 
the potential role of unobserved heterogeneity across countries. 
Conditioning on demographic measures of maturity and controlling for unobserved 
characteristics does have a significant impact on our estimates of the effect of changing 
age structure on sigma-convergence. When unobserved characteristics are taken into 
account and the adjusted conditional income gaps are plugged into equation (10), as in 
section 4.3 above and represented in rows 3 of columns 2 and 4 of Table 4, the share of 
variation in global income dispersion explained by changes in the size of the working age 
population drops from 100 to 62 percent (column 2, row 12). Similarly, the importance 
of changes in age structure with regards to global sigma-convergence falls from 45 to 14 
percent (column 4 row 12) under the fixed effect adjusted estimates. This fall occurs primarily 
because the between-effect loses much of its force when the smaller income gaps (which 
control for unobserved country components) are used.22 
                                                                          
22. This result, however, is partly misleading because the within sector variance gaps have been kept constant. In reality, 
when this procedure has been performed in other contexts, the variance structure is re-estimated to take into account 
possible age structure effects within groups. Unfortunately, this is where the limitations of using macro-data 
alongside micro-methods start to take hold. We simply do not have enough independent observations to create similar 
style “convergence club groupings” –akin to the skill groupings used in Card (2001)– to re-estimate the within group 
effects of age structure properly. 
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6 Conclusions 
Given that savings and productivity follow a hump shaped profile with respect to age and 
given that demographic profiles vary across countries, population age structure may be 
linked to differences in levels of economic development. The primary purpose of this paper 
was precisely to assess this connection between demographic and economic developments. 
Our results point to several key finding on this issue. In particular we show that countries 
defined as being demographically mature are significantly better off in terms of income per 
head than younger counterparts. Using two definitions of demographic maturity –a measure 
of potentially active persons (aged 15-64) as a share of the total population and a 
measure identifying the share of prime-aged persons (aged 34-54) within the potentially active 
working age population– we show that, even after adjusting for country-specific effects, 
demographic maturation (i. e., the growing proportion of countries with mature populations) 
has largely contributed to the increase in global per capita GDP since 1960. We also find that 
demographic maturation has contributed significantly to the widening of global inequality 
across countries (i. e., the lack of observed sigma-convergence). This effect is present 
despite the fact that cross-country income dispersion is lower within mature country-club 
groupings. The reason for the overall widening is that this within group effect has not been 
large enough to offset income differentials between young and mature country groupings, 
meaning that demographic maturation has, on balance, served to retard rather than abet 
the process of sigma-convergence. 
Taken as a whole, these results complement recent theoretical and empirical 
work on population size and economic development [Alesina et al. (2003); Jones (2003)] 
and reinforce the findings of Bloom et al. (2001), Feyer (2002), and Gómez and Hernández 
de Cos (2003) who have found positive links between mature demographic age structures 
and cross-country economic growth rates. 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
 
Variable Definition Source 
 
1. Prime Age Share 
 
The fraction of the working age 
population aged 35-54. 
 
 
 
United Nations (1998) 
2. Prime Age Sector An indicator variable is constructed 
whereby countries with more that 36 
percent of the working age population 
prime aged are assigned 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
 
United Nations (1998) 
3. Income Per Capita  
(In Constant Prices) 
Log of Real GDP per capita is a chain 
index (in 1996 $US prices). For more 
details, see Data Appendix in Penn 
World Tables 6.1. 
 
Heston and Summers (2002) 
4. Voter Turnout The fraction of votes cast by the 
voting age population in national 
elections. 
 
IDEA (2003) 
5. National Savings  The percentage share of current 
savings to GDP. Derived by 
subtracting gross consumption and 
government consumption from 100. 
 
Heston and Summers (2002) 
6. Openness Exports plus imports divided by real 
GDP (chain). 
 
Heston and Summers (2002) 
7. Inequality Measured as the GINI coefficient. 
 
Deininger and Squire (1996) 
   
 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS  
0304 ALBERTO CABRERO, CARLOS CHULIÁ AND ANTONIO MILLARUELO: An assessment of macroeconomic 
divergences in the euro area. (The Spanish original of this publication has the same number.) 
0305 ALICIA GARCÍA HERRERO AND CÉSAR MARTÍN MACHUCA: La política monetaria en Japón: lecciones a 
extraer en la comparación con la de los EEUU. 
0306 ESTHER MORAL AND SAMUEL HURTADO: Evolución de la calidad del factor trabajo en España. 
0307 JOSÉ LUIS MALO DE MOLINA: Una visión macroeconómica de los veinticinco años de vigencia 
de la Constitución Española. 
0308 ALICIA GARCÍA HERRERO AND DANIEL NAVIA SIMÓN: Determinants and impact of financial sector FDI to 
emerging economies: a home country’s perspective. 
0309 JOSÉ MANUEL GONZÁLEZ-MÍNGUEZ, PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS AND ANA DEL RÍO: An analysis  of the 
impact of GDP revisions on cyclically adjusted budget balances (CABS). 
0401 J. RAMÓN MARTÍNEZ-RESANO: Central Bank financial independence. 
0402 JOSÉ LUIS MALO DE MOLINA AND FERNANDO RESTOY: Recent trends in corporate and household balance 
sheets in Spain: macroeconomic implications. (The Spanish original of this publication has the same number.) 
0403 ESTHER GORDO, ESTHER MORAL AND MIGUEL PÉREZ: Algunas implicaciones de la ampliación de la UE para 
la economía española.  
0404 LUIS JULIÁN ÁLVAREZ GONZÁLEZ, PILAR CUADRADO SALINAS, JAVIER JAREÑO MORAGO AND ISABEL 
SÁNCHEZ GARCÍA: El impacto de la puesta en circulación del euro sobre los precios de consumo. 
0405 ÁNGEL ESTRADA, PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS and JAVIER JAREÑO: Una estimación del crecimiento 
potencial de la economía española. 
0406 ALICIA GARCÍA-HERRERO AND DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA: Where is the Chinese banking system going with 
the ongoing reform? 
0407 MIGUEL DE LAS CASAS, SANTIAGO FERNÁNDEZ DE LIS, EMILIANO GONZÁLEZ-MOTA AND CLARA MIRA-
SALAMA: A review of progress in the reform of the International Financial Architecture since the Asian crisis. 
0408 GIANLUCA CAPORELLO AND AGUSTÍN MARAVALL: Program TSW. Revised manual. Version May 2004. 
0409 OLYMPIA BOVER: The Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF): description and methods of the 2002 
wave. (There is a Spanish version of this edition with the same number.) 
0410 MANUEL ARELLANO, SAMUEL BENTOLILA AND OLYMPIA BOVER: Paro y prestaciones: nuevos resultados 
para España. 
0501 JOSÉ RAMÓN MARTÍNEZ-RESANO: Size and heterogeneity matter. A microstructure-based analysis of 
regulation of secondary markets for government bonds. 
0502 ALICIA GARCÍA-HERRERO, SERGIO GAVILÁ AND DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA: China’s banking reform: an 
assessment of its evolution and possible impact. 
0503 ANA BUISÁN, DAVID LEARMONTH AND MARÍA SEBASTIÁ BARRIEL: An industry approach to understanding 
export performance: stylised facts and empirical estimation. 
0504 ANA BUISÁN AND FERNANDO RESTOY: Cross-country macroeconometric heterogeneity in EMU. 
0505 JOSÉ LUIS MALO DE MOLINA: Una larga fase de expansión de la economía española. 
0506 VICTOR GARCÍA-VAQUERO AND JORGE MARTÍNEZ: Fiscalidad de la vivienda en España. 
0507 JAIME CARUANA: Monetary policy, financial stability and asset prices. 
0601 JUAN F. JIMENO, JUAN A. ROJAS AND SERGIO PUENTE: Modelling the impact of aging on Social Security 
expenditures. 
0602 PABLO MARTÍN-ACEÑA: La Banque de France, la BRI et la création du Service des Études de la Banque 
d’Espagne au début des années 1930. (There is a Spanish version of this edition with the same number.) 
0603 CRISTINA BARCELÓ: Imputation of the 2002 wave of the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF). 
0604 RAFAEL GÓMEZ AND PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS: The importance of being mature: The effect of 
demographic maturation on global per-capita income. 
 
 
 
Unidad de Publicaciones 
Alcalá, 522; 28027 Madrid 
Telephone +34 91 338 6363. Fax +34 91 338 6488 
e-mail: Publicaciones@bde.es 
www.bde.es 
 

